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ARE SECURITIES REGULATORS PREPARED 
FOR A TRULY TRANSNATIONAL 
EXCHANGE? 
INTRODUCTION 
n April 4, 2007, NYSE Euronext Inc., the holding company of 
NYSE Group Inc. (“NYSE”) and Euronext N.V. (“Euronext”), 
commenced trading as the “world’s largest and most liquid exchange 
group.”1 The combination of NYSE and Euronext “marks a notable step 
in the continuing globalization of the world’s capital markets.”2 On June 
1, 2006, NYSE and Euronext, two separate publicly held companies at 
the time, signed an agreement to combine the two securities trading ex-
changes in a “merger of equals” resulting in the creation of the first 
trans-Atlantic merger of its kind and the world’s first global exchange.3 
The proposed combination was approved by Euronext shareholders on 
December 19, 2006 and by NYSE shareholders on December 20, 2006.4 
Today, NYSE Euronext Inc. is a U.S. holding company with U.S. head-
quarters in New York and international headquarters in Paris.5 The com-
pany operates six cash equities exchanges in five countries and six de-
rivatives exchanges in six countries, and it represents a combined $30.3 
trillion total market capitalization of listed companies with approxi-
mately $139 billion in average daily trading.6 
Financial markets, such as stock exchanges or equity exchanges,7 are a 
place where people come together to trade money for a chance to earn 
more money.8 Exchanges bring together investors, who have funds and 
                                                                                                             
 1. NYSE Euronext, NYSE Euronext At-a-Glance, http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/ 
NYSE_Euronext_pk.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2008). 
 2. Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC], Euronext Regu-
lators Sign Regulatory Cooperation Arrangement (Jan. 25, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-8.htm. 
 3. Press Release, NYSE Group Inc., NYSE Group and Euronext N.V. Agree to a 
Merger of Equals (June 1, 2006), available at http://www.nyse.com/about/publication/ 
1145959806931.html. 
 4. For discussion on Euronext shareholder approval, see U.S.-Europe Exchange One 
Step Closer: The All-But-Sure Merger of the NYSE and European Bourses Will Stream-
line Operations and Lower Transaction Costs, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Dec. 20, 2006. For 
discussion on NYSE shareholder approval, see Big Board Holders Back Euronext Deal, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2006, at C6. 
 5. NYSE Euronext At-a-Glance, supra note 1. 
 6. Id. 
 7. An “exchange” is defined in section 3(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78(c) (2006). 
 8. J. William Hicks, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. SECURITIES LAW § 1:1 
(West Group, 2006). Stock markets are “important part or our lives.” Norman S. Poser, 
O 
686 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:2 
seek a favorable return on these funds through a contribution of capital to 
a business in exchange for an equity interest conferring ownership and a 
right to receive profits, and the businesses that seek such capital.9 Some 
goals of equity market participants are efficiency and improving the allo-
cation of resources, and the regulation of markets is essential to these 
goals.10 Through the promotion of investor confidence, the regulation of 
securities increases efficiency and confers benefits on market partici-
pants, including the reduction of transaction costs and enhanced liquid-
ity.11 Empirical evidence suggests that strong securities laws “encourage 
economic development.”12 The “law matters” in protecting the integrity 
and prosperity of securities markets and exchanges because the strength 
of legal protection will determine companies’ access to external fi-
nance.13 
Historically, securities regulators have worked to promote market effi-
ciency within their own nation state. Stock exchanges themselves have 
made an essential contribution to regulation by providing “orderly finan-
cial markets.”14 Domestic governmental organizations have also played a 
pivotal role in regulating securities markets through applying compre-
hensive networks of regulations and safeguards that ensure the integrity 
of the markets and financial systems. Due to high communication and 
                                                                                                             
The Stock Exchanges of the United States and Europe: Automation, Globalization, and 
Consolidation, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 497, 497 (2001). 
 9. Hicks, supra note 8 § 1:2. 
 10. Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regula-
tion, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 713 (2006). (“[T]he ultimate goal of securities regulation is to 
attain efficient financial markets and thereby improve the allocation of resources in the 
economy.”). 
 11. Id. at 715–716. See also American Bar Association, Special Study Group of the 
Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Special Study on Market Structure, List-
ing Standards and Corporate Governance, 57 BUS. LAW 1487, 1496–1497 (2002) [here-
inafter ABA Report]. 
 12. John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and 
Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
1757, 1828 (2002) (“[S]trong laws protecting minority investors are a precondition to 
financial development.”). 
 13. Id. at 1829. The more confidence investors have in the market and in the ex-
change, the more likely they are to provide capital to invest in the companies. See gener-
ally id.; ABA Report, supra note 11. The United States began to recognize and take seri-
ously the need for financial disclosure by listed companies after the stock market crash of 
1929 when, with access only to limited financial disclosure requirements, investor confi-
dence was not maintained and companies lost significant access to external capital. See 
ABA Report, supra note 11, at 1499. 
 14. Paris Europlace, Lachmann Report, Summary and Conclusion (Oct. 4, 2006), 
available at http://www.paris-europlace.net/files/report_lachmann.pdf [hereinafter Lach- 
mann Report]. 
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technology costs, trading has remained relatively national, and laws gov-
erning these trades have remained within each country’s jurisdiction.15 
This, however, is becoming increasingly problematic as capital flow 
through stock exchanges is “no longer limited by national boundaries”16 
and exchanges become more global, functioning on an international lev-
el. 
Because the future of stock exchanges and the markets that they oper-
ate is “inseparably linked”17 and inevitably cross-border, securities regu-
lation should try to meet this new market structure and become, in a way, 
cross-border itself. As the cost of communication and the movement of 
information is falling, the barriers that kept stock exchanges national are 
eroding.18 Additionally, stock exchanges are demutualizing and convert-
ing from not-for-profit to for-profit corporations.19 The public share-
holder-owner of the stock exchange is interested in maximizing profits 
through efficient operations, and this seems to suggest a movement to-
wards consolidation of stock markets in order to direct pools of capital to 
the most efficient and productive uses.20 
Once stock exchanges operate across nations, companies listed on 
these exchanges will trade across nations, and the current nationalistic 
structure of regulating these companies and trades will no longer suffice. 
The question then becomes who should regulate. Stock exchanges them-
selves could utilize listing requirements and other rules governing all 
participants, but self-regulation is no longer a viable option because de-
mutualization has caused an inherent conflict of interest between owners 
and customers. The national regulators could come to a consensus and 
harmonize regulations, but converging national regulations is plagued by 
conflicting legal systems. Therefore, in the face of a new cross-border 
model for stock exchange operation, the international community should 
find a new model for international securities regulation. 
Part I of this Note discusses the details of the merger between NYSE 
and Euronext and argues that, while the current plan is to maintain sepa-
rately regulated platforms within each jurisdiction, there is an impending 
need for further harmonization between the European Union and the 
United States securities regulatory agencies. Part II explores the possibil-
ity of allowing future cross-border exchanges to self-regulate and identi-
fies the problems inherent in such self-regulation. Part III will discuss the 
                                                                                                             
 15. See infra text accompanying notes 61–93. 
 16. Poser, supra note 8, at 498. 
 17. Lachmann Report, supra note 14. 
 18. See infra text accompanying notes 61–93. 
 19. See id. 
 20. Poser, supra note 8, at 499. 
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current attempts at harmonization, cooperation between the regulatory 
authorities in the European Union and the United States, and the underly-
ing difficulties and inadequacies of harmonization between these juris-
dictions due to each legal system. Finally, Part IV will suggest an alter-
native approach that proposes the creation of a cross-border organization 
better equipped to handle the international evolution of stock markets. 
I. GLOBALIZATION OF STOCK EXCHANGES 
NYSE Euronext Inc. is the holding company recently created through 
the merger of NYSE Group Inc. and Euronext N.V., two operators of 
long-standing stock exchange platforms.21 NYSE Group Inc.22 operates 
the New York Stock Exchange, the largest existing cash equities ex-
change.23 It is a publicly held for-profit enterprise with headquarters in 
New York City, but it is regulated by the United States government and 
services the entire United States as “the leader in providing the best pric-
es and lowest trading costs.”24 The NYSE has traded in auction format25 
since 1985 but has recently adopted a new hybrid market model that “in-
tegrates the best aspects of the auction market with automated trading [so 
that] customers receive the broadest choice of trade execution prefer-
ences.”26 In this hybrid market, specialists27 and brokers28 deal with or-
                                                                                                             
 21. NYSE Euronext At-a-Glance, supra note 1. 
 22. NYSE Group Inc. also operates the NYSE Arca, but for the purposes of this Note, 
focus is limited to the New York Stock Exchange. NYSE Group Inc. was formed in 2006 
through the merger between New York Stock Exchange Inc. and Acrchipelago Holdings. 
The New York Stock Exchange Inc. was previously a not-for-profit entity. However, 
NYSE was created as a for-profit publicly-traded company. See generally Press Release, 
NYSE Group Inc., New York Stock Exchange/Archipelago Holdings Merger Complete 
(Mar. 7, 2006) available at http://www.nyse.com/press/114172984519.html. 
 23. NYSE Group Roles Out Options Trading Platform, 13 NYSE GROUP NEWSLETTER 
7 Dec. 2006, available at http://www.nyse.com/about/publication/newsletter.html. See 
also Press Release, NYSE Group Inc., supra note 3. 
 24. NYSE, A Guide to the NYSE Marketplace 5 (2d ed. 2006), available at 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/nyse_bluebook.pdf [hereinafter NYSE Guide]. 
 25. Trades were made in person on an auction floor where professionals interacted 
with quotes and orders to obtain the best price possible for their customers. See generally 
NYSE Group Inc., Glossary, http://www.nyse.com/glossary/1042235996520.html (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2008). 
 26. NYSE Group Inc., NYSE Hybrid Market FAQ (2006), available at http://www. 
nyse.com/pdfs/hybridfaqs.pdf. 
 27. A specialist in the NYSE is a “member of the NYSE who is responsible for main-
taining a fair and orderly market in the stocks they are allocated. At all times, specialists 
must put their customers’ interests above their own.” NYSE Guide, supra note 24, at 9. 
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ders both electronically and in person to create more efficient trade-
execution quality.29 
Euronext N.V. is a public limited liability company organized under 
the laws of the Netherlands.30 It provides exchange platforms for regu-
lated stock and derivatives in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Portu-
gal, and the United Kingdom31 and has taken steps in recent years to-
wards providing users with a single market.32 The company was formed 
in 2000 as the first truly cross-border exchange and in 2004 it success-
fully integrated its markets through a harmonized IT platform that cre-
ated an efficient, cost effective, and highly liquid cross-border ex-
change.33 Each market participant now has a single point of access to 
trading since the exchanges run on an entirely electronic trading sys-
tem.34 
A. The Merger 
Before NYSE Euronext Inc. was created, when the merger was simply 
a proposition, NYSE and Euronext gave many reasons why the merger 
would be in both companies’ best interests. In the words of NYSE CEO 
John A. Thain, “In today’s marketplace, it’s not enough to simply be a 
leader in the United States. It’s not enough simply to be the champion in 
Europe. It really is important to be a global competitor.”35 The merger is 
the manifestation of the strategic vision shared by NYSE and Euronext 
for “further market consolidation, greater diversity of product offerings, 
and a much better ability to reach investors and issuers around the 
world.”36 The end result was to be a combination of “NYSE’s global 
                                                                                                             
 28. A broker is an “agent who handles the public’s orders to buy and sell securities, 
commodities, or other property.” Brokers may be employed independently or by a bro-
kerage house. Id. at 8. 
 29. NYSE Group Inc., Hybrid Market Training Program (Sept. 2006), available at 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/hm_booklet.pdf. The NYSE Group conducted a survey that 
showed that 400 listed-company executives consider trade-execution quality to be the 
most important consideration in choosing a listing venue. Id. See also NYSE Guide, su-
pra note 24, at 9. 
 30. NYSE Euronext Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-4), at 6 (Sept. 21, 2006), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1368007/000104746906011989/a 
2173235zf1_s-4.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2008) [hereinafter Form S-4]. 
 31. Only derivatives in the U.K., Press Release, NYSE Group Inc., supra note 3. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.; see also Euronext, Euronext Activities (on file with author). 
 34. Euronext, Euronext Activities (on file with author). 
 35. NYSE Group and Euronext Announce Merger, 13 NYSE GROUP NEWSLETTER 3, 
June 2006, available at http://www.nyse.com/about/publication/1145959806931.html 
[hereinafter NYSE Group Newsletter]. 
 36. Id. (quoting NYSE Group Inc. Chairman Marshall N. Carter). 
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brand and leading cash marketplace with Euronext’s international, cross-
border, and diversified product range, technology and integration skills” 
to form a winning global platform.37 
On September 21, 2006, NYSE Euronext Inc. submitted a form38 to the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) that laid out 
many of the technical details of the merger.39 The SEC declared the form 
effective on November 27, 2006.40 As discussed in the form, NYSE Eu-
ronext Inc. is a United States holding company that fully owns both the 
NYSE and Euronext; however, the NYSE and Euronext remain separate 
subsidiaries of NYSE Euronext Inc.41 The merger extends Euronext’s 
new technology integration techniques across the Atlantic, and NYSE 
Euronext Inc. now operates on a single IT system42 to allow for more 
efficient securities trading. 
One of the largest concerns voiced about this merger focused on regu-
latory issues. Although NYSE Euronext Inc. operates on a single IT sys-
tem, the exchanges operate as separate platforms.43 This means that regu-
lation remains within each jurisdiction: European markets continue to be 
regulated by their existing regulators, and the SEC regulates U.S. mar-
kets.44 “The structure has been designed to make sure that the [SEC] con-
tinues to regulate the U.S. exchanges, and the college of regulators that 
currently operates in Europe . . . will continue to regulate those European 
exchanges.”45 
A large part of this pre-merger regulatory concern was centered on the 
application of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“Sarbanes-Oxley”) to listed com-
                                                                                                             
 37. Id. (quoting Euronext N.V. CEO Jean-François Théodore). 
 38. NYSE Group Inc submitted Form S-4, a registration statement filed with the SEC 
to register additional securities for an offering connected with the merger. NYSE Group 
filed this form for approval to issue shares of NYSE Euronext to the current shareholders 
of NYSE Group Inc. The SEC made the formal approval on Nov. 27, 2007. When the 
merger was complete, one share of NYSE Group Inc. was replaced with one share of 
NYSE Euronext, and NYSE Group was brought under the new holding company NYSE 
Euronext Inc. Euronext N.V. was brought under the holding group through an exchange 
offer whereby shares of Euronext N.V. were replaced with shares of NYSE Euronext Inc. 
or cash, depending on the election of the shareholder. See generally Form S-4, supra note 
30. 
 39. Form S-4, supra note 30. 
 40. NYSE Group and Euronext Shareholders to Vote on Merger, 13 NYSE GROUP 
NEWSLETTER 7 Dec. 2006, http://www.nyse.com/about/publication/1164799108211.html. 
 41. Form S-4, supra note 30. 
 42. NYSE Group Newsletter, supra note 35. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Kip Betz, “No Regulatory ‘Leakage’ Created by NYSE-Euronext Deal, Thain 
Says,” 38 SECURITIES REGULATIONS & LAW (BNA) 1110, June 26, 2006. 
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panies.46 The concern is that if Euronext were considered an exchange 
operated in the United States, all companies listed on Euronext would 
become subject to Sarbanes-Oxley and companies would incur signifi-
cantly higher costs in order to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley. 47 Neverthe-
less, Securities and Exchange Commissioner Annette Nazareth declared 
prior to the merger that because the exchanges would remain separate 
platforms, U.S. regulation would not reach companies that remain not 
listed on the U.S. platform, and specifically announced that “Sarbanes-
Oxley would not apply to any market not registered in the U.S., nor 
would it apply to companies listed on that non-U.S. market.”48 Expecting 
the success of the merger, a professor of securities law at the Fordham 
School of Law in New York was of the opinion that the proposed merger 
would not create a regulatory problem.49 In the words of House Financial 
Services Chairman Michael Oxley (R-Ohio), “It’s important to note that 
the merger will not undermine Sarbanes-Oxley protections for investors 
in U.S.-listed firms, and those protections will remain the same.”50 Euro-
pean Union Internal Market Commissioner Charlie McCreevy also de-
clared that “consolidation of exchanges should not lead to regulatory 
spill-over.”51 
On the other hand, there was significant resistance to the NYSE Eu-
ronext merger, most of which was from the European Union and espe-
cially from European politicians.52 Even Commissioner McCreevy, who 
                                                                                                             
 46. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. See infra text accompanying notes 113–132. 
 47. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was the United States’ legislative reaction to 
corporate scandals of the 1990s and was meant to heighten regulatory standards over 
corporate governance, accounting, and disclosure. Sarbanes-Oxley’s main focus was to 
increase disclosure by regulated companies to increase investor confidence and thereby 
increase the strength of the United States financial markets. After Sarbanes-Oxley was 
enacted, compliance was gradually implemented according to compliance dates imposed 
by the SEC. See generally Irwin H. Steinhorn & William M. Lewis, Corporate Compli-
ance Under the Regulations Implementing Sarbanes-Oxley, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 
30 (Spring, 2006). 
 48. Annette L. Nazareth, U.S. Securities Exchange Commissioner, Remarks Before 
the NYSE Regulation Second Annual Securities Conference (June 20, 2006). 
 49. Kip Betz & Rachel McTague, NYSE, Euronext $20B Merger Plan Would Create 
World’s Largest Exchange, 38 SECURITIES REGULATIONS & LAW (BNA) 962, June 5, 
2006. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Arthur Rogers, EU Official Will Not ‘Stand in Way’ of Merger Between NYSE, 
Euornext, 38 SECURITIES REGULATIONS & LAW (BNA) 1190, July 10, 2006. 
 52. Donna Block, SEC Calms Europe on Sarbanes-Oxley, THE DAILY DEAL, June 6, 
2006 (“Objections have been mounting from European politicians to the NYSE Group 
Inc.’s $10 billion agreed takeover of pan-European bourse Euronext NV.”). 
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announced he would not “stand in the way” of the merger, conditioned 
his statement on regulatory aspects of the merger being properly dealt 
with.53 Moreover, leaders of both France and Germany opposed this 
merger.54 At a summit meeting in Paris on October 12, 2006, both French 
President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Angela Merkel recog-
nized the ongoing market consolidation battle, but they called for a 
“European solution” not including a United States based stock exchange 
such as the New York Stock Exchange.55 
Evidencing such resistance, a working group of Paris Europlace56 pub-
lished a report assessing the proposed merger between NYSE and Euron-
ext in October 2006.57 This report concluded that the merger “gives con-
trol to NYSE with no long-term assurance of the continued development 
of the European side of operations in the interest of users.”58 The group 
concluded that it would not be the merger of equals as was publicized, 
but would instead simply give the NYSE control of Euronext because, 
among many other proffered reasons, eleven out of twenty directors of 
the new company would be Americans and both the CEO and CFO 
would come from NYSE.59 Serving as evidence of the European fears 
and reservations to the United States securities regulatory regime, the 
report called for an “unqualified assurance” that the risk of U.S. regula-
tory spill-over into Europe was under control, and deemed such assur-
ance “vitally important” to all Euronext participants.60 
B. Cross-Border Exchanges 
Despite the resistance, legally required regulatory clearances were all 
obtained61 and, on April 4, 2007, NYSE Euronext Inc. began trading 
                                                                                                             
 53. Rogers, supra note 51, at 1190. 
 54. Lawrence J. Speer, French, German Leaders Join Lobby Opposing Merger of 
Euronext with NYSE, 38 SECURITIES REGULATION & LAW (BNA) 1720, Oct. 16, 2006. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Paris Europlace is “the organization which promotes Paris as a financial market.” 
Its purpose is to bring together the major “players in the financial industry,” and it con-
ducts international promotion, reform programs, and lobbying functions. See Paris Euro-
place, Paris EUROPLACE, Your Hub to Euroland, http://www.paris-europlace.net/ (last 
visited Jan. 14, 2008). 
 57. Lachmann Report, supra note 14. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Approval from the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (France) was obtained on 
January 19, 2007. Press Release, NYSE Euronext Inc., Combined Offer (Jan. 19, 2007), 
available at http://www.euronext.com/fic/000/019/025/190252.pdf. The Dutch Ministry 
of Finance issued a declaration conferring formal approval of the merger on February 2, 
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shares. Given the success of the merger between NYSE and Euronext, 
there is reason to expect stock exchanges will continue to move towards 
worldwide consolidation.62 A stock exchange is itself a business enter-
prise.63 Like any other business company, stock exchange management 
will focus on cutting expenses and increasing income.64 This focus has 
become increasingly important due to “the recent trend of demutualiza-
tion.”65 Demutualization refers to changes in the ownership structure of 
stock exchanges whereby exchanges organized as not-for-profit entities 
owned by members convert to publicly-owned organizations, usually for-
profit corporations.66 This trend has been heavily influenced and driven 
                                                                                                             
2007. Press Release, NYSE Group Inc., Euronext and NYSE Group Welcome Dutch 
Ministry of Finance Declaration (Feb. 2, 2007), available at http://www.euronext. 
com/fic/000/014/938/149385.pdf. The SEC approved the merger on February 14, 2007. 
The Monitor, 26 NO. 4 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 21, 21 (Apr. 2007). Al-
though not legally required for the merger to proceed, the SEC and the College of Euron-
ext Regulators (the Authority for the Financial Markets (Netherlands), Autorité des 
Marchés Financiers (France), Banking Finance and Insurance Commission (Belgium), 
Comissão do Mercado de Calores Mobiliários (Portugal), and Financial Services Author-
ity (United Kingdom)) signed a Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation in mar-
ket oversight on January 25, 2007. Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consulta-
tion, Cooperation and the Exchange of Information Related to Market Oversight (Jan. 25, 
2007), available at http://www.sec.com/news/press/2007/2007-8_mou.pdf. 
 62. “[T]he difficulties inherent in coordinating different national rules and regulatory 
systems will not stand in the way of the creation of a world stock market.” Poser, supra 
note 8, at 540. 
 63. By fulfilling the functions of market organization, information distribution, mar-
ket regulation, and setting standards, stock exchanges are business enterprises. As market 
organizers, stock exchanges have been working towards making trading floors obsolete 
and have been integrating the use of technology in place of traditional human traders. 
Technology has also promoted exchanges’ role as information distributors, which has 
become increasingly important for trades to happen more efficiently. Stock exchanges 
also regulate the markets that they operate and organize through rules for listed compa-
nies, as well as all other market participants. These rules foster investor confidence and 
provide fair trading and accurate price discovery. Through the rules, employed by both 
the NYSE and Euronext, stock exchanges have become corporate governance standards 
setters. Each one of these four roles will undoubtedly be performed more efficiently 
through consolidation of exchanges. See generally Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock Ex-
changes at the Crossroads, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2545–2550 (2006). 
 64. Id. at 2549; see also International Organization of Securities Commissioners 
[IOSCO], Technical Committee, Discussion Paper on Stock Exchange Demutualization 
(Dec. 2000), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD112.pdf 
[hereinafter IOSCO Technical Committee Paper]. 
 65. Fleckner, supra note 63, at 2551. 
 66. Id. at 2554–2555. 
Historically, most exchanges were not-for-profit organizations owned by their 
members. Over the past few years, there has been a trend among exchanges to 
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by recent changes in technology and increased competition between 
stock exchanges.67 
NYSE Euronext Inc. is one of such demutualized and publicly held 
corporations listed on both the New York and Paris exchange plat-
forms.68 Demutualization brings with it a different corporate governance 
structure where shareholder interests are likely to dominate over the con-
stituent groups who used to be in a position to exercise veto powers 
when the exchanges were operated as not-for-profit, member-owned cor-
porations.69 Because shareholders consistently try to maximize profits 
and the value of their investment, they support innovation in general and 
look favorably on acquisition and merger proposals.70 It has been said, in 
light of demutualization, that “the rate of merger and acquisition activity 
seems likely to grow” since the dominant consideration of stock ex-
changes is now profitability.71 Consequently, the number of stock ex-
changes operating around the world is likely to shrink radically from the 
150 of today.72 
“[T]he stock exchanges of the United States and Europe seem to be on 
a course of consolidation, largely driven by the need of the large firms 
                                                                                                             
consider alternative governance structures to these traditional mutual or coop-
erative models. The transformation of an exchange into a for-profit share-
holder-owned company is referred to as ‘demutualization.’ In most cases, the 
demutualized exchange becomes a for-profit enterprise. 
IOSCO Technical Committee Paper, supra note 64, at 1. Internationally, demutualization 
began with the Stockholmsbörsen (Stockholm Stock Exchange) in 1993. Euronext demu-
tualized 1997 and listed publicly in 2001. Between 1998 and 2001, the Australian Stock 
Exchange, Deutsche Börse, and the London Stock Exchange all underwent demutualiza-
tion and listed publicly. It was almost ten years before the United States stock exchanges 
followed suit, but most of the prominent United States exchanges have been demutual-
ized, and many are publicly held. The Nasdaq Stock Market demutualized and publicly 
listed in 2002. The Pacific Exchange and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange demutualized 
in 2004. The Chicago Stock Exchange followed in 2005. The Pacific Exchange is a pub-
lic company, but the Philadelphia Stock Exchange and the Chicago Stock Exchange are 
not publicly traded. The NYSE demutualized in 2006 and is publicly traded. See gener-
ally Fleckner, supra note 63, at 2555–2562; see also Coffee, supra note 12, at 1800. 
 67. IOSCO Technical Committee Paper, supra note 64, at 2. 
 68. NYSE Group Newsletter, supra note 35. 
 69. Coffee, supra note 12, at 1801. This takes away from members of the stock ex-
change the control of decisions concerning the range of services to be offered by the ex-
change, as well as price and quality. Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Gov-
ernance Listing Requirements, 54 SMU L. REV. 325, 347–348 (2001). 
 70. Coffee, supra note 12. 
 71. Id. 
 72. For the estimate of 150 stock exchanges operating worldwide, see Craig Karmin 
et al., Vision Test: Nasdaq’s Drive to Build Global Exchange Hits Some Major Potholes, 
WALL ST. J., June 25, 2001, at A1; see also Coffee, supra note 12, at 1759. 
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and institutions that control order flow to reduce transaction costs.”73 
Additionally, driven by the desire to maximize profits, stock exchanges 
will move towards consolidation in order to obtain a greater market 
share.74 It has been argued that stock exchanges are a form of natural 
monopoly and that major markets will have the effect of draining smaller 
markets, and, in the absence of agreements between exchanges to form 
an alliance, the end result will be “winner-takes-all,” leaving only a few 
large stock exchanges in the major financial centers of the world.75 
In fact, such radical shrinking in the number of stock exchanges has 
happened before when over 100 U.S. securities exchanges either con-
solidated or shut down in the early twentieth century.76 During the nine-
teenth century, stock exchanges in the United States were sheltered from 
competition from other stock exchanges through geographic and com-
munication barriers.77 However, as technological innovations such as the 
telegraph, the telephone, and the stock ticker reduced the cost of barriers, 
more efficient national exchanges began to eliminate the local ex-
changes.78 As stock exchanges were more easily able to compete with 
one another, they attempted to consolidate in order to obtain a greater 
market share, enabling larger exchanges to compete more effectively.79 
Today the same evolution of stock exchanges and break down of cost 
barriers can be identified on an international scale. What used to be high 
cost barriers to communications and geography between international 
countries are being reshaped by developments in technology.80 Global-
ization has increased the ease with which both information and capital 
flow from one country to another, and securities markets are now able to 
compete worldwide.81 This process, which began in 2000 through the 
                                                                                                             
 73. Poser, supra note 8, at 539. 
 74. Coffee, supra note 12, at 1760. 
 75. See id. at 1760 n.6 (citing Carmine Di Noia, Competition and Integration Among 
Stock Exchanges in Europe: Network Effect, Implicit Mergers and Remote Access, 7 EUR. 
FIN. MGMT. 39, 42 (2001)). 
 76. Id. at 1759. There were nearly 250 stock exchanges operating in the United States 
during the nineteenth century and only slightly over 100 operating by the beginning of 
the twentieth century. Id. at 1759 n.2. 
 77. Id. at 1759 n.2 (citing R.C. MICHIE, THE LONDON AND NEW YORK STOCK 
EXCHANGES: 1850–1914, 167 (1987)). These barriers included the high costs of both long 
distance communication and the deliverance of stock certificates once a purchase was 
completed. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1760. 
 80. Id. at 1759. 
 81. Id. at 1760. 
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creation of Euronext, the first cross-border exchange,82 has become more 
relevant through the creation of NYSE Euronext Inc., and will continue 
into the future. 
The traditional stock exchange follows the auction model of the NYSE 
before the integration of their hybrid market. Stock exchanges were op-
erated on a trading floor where individual broker-members of the stock 
exchange brought offers to buy and sell to one floor where they would 
attempt, directly competing in person through an “open-outcry,” to get 
the best price for the trade.83 In recent years, markets, especially in Eu-
rope, have begun to employ an electronic trading system that no longer 
requires persons to gather in one place.84 As a result of the development 
of technology, people can sit behind a desk anywhere in the world and 
conduct trades by a simple push of the button.85 The combination of the 
ease with which trades can be conducted across national borders and the 
public-owner’s desire to maximize profits through obtaining a greater 
market share for the exchange will not be the sole reason for consolida-
tion. However, the “increasing demand for round-the-clock interconti-
nental trading”86 will serve as a driving force for stock market consolida-
tion across national borders.87 
Numerous supervisory authorities, including Securities and Exchange 
Commissioners in the United States and their European counterparts, 
exchange platform Chairmen and CEOs, and academic scholars, have 
                                                                                                             
 82. Euronext N.V. emerged from a merger in 2000 of the Paris, Amsterdam, and 
Brussels Exchanges. NYSE Euronext, History, http://www.euronext.com/editorial/wide/ 
editorial-1994-EN.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2008). 
 83. NYSE Guide, supra note 24, at 5. 
 84. “European exchanges no longer look anything like traditional stock exchanges.” 
Poser, supra note 8, at 501. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Euronext NV Shareholders Vote to Approve Planned NYSE Merger, Big Board’s 
Owners Expected to Give OK. CHI. TRIB. Dec. 20, 2006, at 4 [hereinafter Euronext NV 
Shareholders]. 
 87. Lewis D. Solomon & Louise Corso, The Impact of Technology on the Trading of 
Securities: The Emerging Global Market and the Implications for Regulation, 24 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 299, 299 (1991). 
Technology has made it possible for information regarding stock prices to be 
sent all over the world in seconds. Presently, computers route orders and exe-
cute small trades directly from the brokerage firm’s terminal to the exchange. 
Computers now link together various stock exchanges, a practice which is help-
ing to create a single global market for the trading of securities. The continuing 
improvements in technology will make it possible to execute trades globally by 
electronic trading systems. 
Id. 
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recognized the future globalization of stock exchanges and acknowl-
edged the difficulties in harmonization of regulations.88 Global expansion 
is not limited to the single merger creating NYSE Euronext Inc. For ex-
ample, before the merger with NYSE, Euronext had already put signifi-
cant effort into cross-border exchanges culminating in harmonized IT 
platforms shared by all its markets in 2004.89 Moreover, Nasdaq has ac-
quired over twenty-five percent of the London Stock Exchange.90 In light 
of these recent trends towards globalization, authorities realize it is time 
to work towards more cooperation between regulators and greater con-
vergence of regulations across jurisdictions in order to achieve consistent 
international standards to govern such international entities. The National 
Association of Securities Dealers Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 
Robert Glauber has recognized that regulating future trades will be chal-
lenging because it will be “unclear now what home-country regulator 
will be responsible for them.”91 
The ultimate purpose of the creation of NYSE Euronext Inc. is to pro-
duce a fully integrated trading platform, 92 and the company has organ-
ized what appears to be a sensible solution to regulation conflicts by 
maintaining separate exchange platforms. However, now that the elec-
tronic trading system of NYSE Euronext Inc. has been implemented, par-
ticipants of the stock exchange could hypothetically sit behind a com-
puter in any part of the world and trade on either of the technically sepa-
rate platforms. In the words of Robert Glauber, “NYSE-Euronext will 
inevitably migrate toward a more completely computerized trading plat-
form. . . . When this happens, trades won’t take place in New York, Lon-
don, or Paris, they’ll take place on a satellite over the Atlantic Ocean. 
What . . . regulator will [be] responsible for those trades?”93 
                                                                                                             
 88. See, e.g., ABA Report, supra note 11; Coffee, supra note 12; Poser, supra note 8; 
Nazareth, supra note 48; Glauber, infra note 92; IOSCO Principles, infra note 216; 
OECD, infra note 206. 
 89. Press Release, NYSE Group Inc., supra note 3. 
 90. Euronext NV Shareholders, supra note 86, at 4. 
 91. Rachel McTague, In Face of Market Globalization, Glauber Raises Question of 
Regulatory Cooperation, 38 SECURITIES REGULATION & LAW (BNA) 1111, June 26, 
2006. 
 92. Robert Glauber, Chairman and CEO, National Association of Securities Dealers, 
Luncheon Address at the Harvard Business School Global Leadership Forum (June 21, 
2006), available at http://www.nasd.com/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/RobertR. 
Glauber/NASDW_016838. 
 93. Id. 
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II. SELF-REGULATION 
One possible answer to this question is to allow the stock exchanges 
themselves to be the primary regulators through their own rules and 
regulations, or self-regulation. Self-regulation has been defined as “[a]n 
organization’s or industry’s control, oversight, or direction of itself ac-
cording to rules and standards that it establishes.”94 Such regulation has 
proven rather effective. Before an issuer may list on either the New York 
Stock Exchange or any of the Euronext platforms, they enter into a con-
tractual listing agreement with the stock exchange and are bound to meet 
certain requirements under the contract.95 
A. Historical Success of Self-Regulatory Organizations 
Early in the history of NYSE listing requirements, the NYSE was sim-
ply concerned with financial disclosure for listed companies.96 Today, 
however, the listing requirements include “independent audit commit-
tees, ownership interests of corporate directors and officers, sharehold-
ers’ voting rights, shareholders’ ownership interests and the maintenance 
of fair and orderly markets in listed securities.”97 The listing require-
ments developed pursuant to the NYSE goal of ensuring integrity of the 
securities markets.98 They are designed to increase investor confidence 
by promoting liquidity and transferability of shares.99 Such listing re-
quirements have proven to be effective in monitoring corporate issuers 
notwithstanding governmental regulations, at least in the United 
States.100 Historically in the United States, listing standards could be con-
sidered a “substitute for government regulation.”101 
                                                                                                             
 94. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1391 (8th ed. 2004). 
 95. This section focuses on the overall effectiveness of the enforcement of regulations 
in stock exchanges through the self-regulatory organization and not the specific regula-
tions themselves. Therefore, the listing requirements of Euronext N.V. will not be dis-
cussed. While the listing requirements for NYSE and Euronext are similar, it should be 
noted that Euronext stock exchanges and the NYSE do not impose the exact same re-
quirements on listed companies. One notable difference is that NYSE traditionally im-
poses higher transparency requirements on listed companies than Euronext imposes on its 
listed companies. Coffee, supra note 12, at 1830. 
 96. See generally Karmel, Listing Requirements, supra note 69, at 328. 
 97. Id. at 329 (citing NYSE Listed Company Manual (1999), available at http://www. 
nyse.com/listed/listed.html). 
 98. Id. at 329. 
 99. ABA Report, supra note 11, at 1497. 
 100. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). This case fore-
closed the possibility that the SEC could impose listing standards governing voting rights 
of shareholders. The stock exchange itself, however, could impose such rights. Therefore, 
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The NYSE, through NYSE Regulation Inc.,102 imposes high corporate 
governance standards on listed companies and has the ability to reach 
beyond the federal regulations.103 Listing standards were originally en-
acted by the NYSE in order to create “a brand name associated with high 
quality.”104 Current listing requirements of the NYSE include independ-
ent audit committee requirements.105 Also, each share from an issuer is 
only entitled to one vote, no more and no less.106 Shareholders must ap-
prove any issuance of more than twenty percent of outstanding common 
stock or voting power.107 Failure to comply with these requirements 
could result in delisting of the issuer from the exchange.108 Each one of 
these rules goes beyond federal regulation and supersedes the authority 
of the SEC to further ensure investor confidence. Additionally, there are 
a number of requirements, such as shareholder approval, that also go be-
yond state law corporate governance laws.109 
Because of such effectiveness, scholars have argued that stock ex-
change self-regulation will be sufficient in an international setting.110 
Some base this argument on a market-based theory of regulating stock 
exchanges and corporate fraud,111 and such arguments include basic 
competition principles. Private investors will feel more secure investing 
in companies that are held to higher standards; therefore, the exchanges 
have incentive to require issuers to meet such standards.112 
                                                                                                             
the stock exchanges have a longer reach than the SEC in the creation and enforcement of 
corporate governance standards. 
 101. “The NYSE argued that if its listing standards for securities offered for sale ade-
quately protected the investing public, then government regulation would be unneces-
sary.” Karmel, Listing Requirements, supra note 69, at 327. 
 102. A wholly owned subsidiary of NYSE Group Inc., NYSE Regulation Inc. is an 
independent, not-for-profit subsidiary that enforces marketplace rules as well as federal 
securities laws against participants of the NYSE. NYSE Guide, supra note 24, at 11. 
 103. See Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d 406. 
 104. ABA Report, supra note 11, at 1497. 
 105. Id. at 1511. 
 106. Id. at 1499. 
 107. Id. at 1511. 
 108. Id. at 1515. 
 109. Id. at 1513–1514. 
 110. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate 
Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002); Poser, 
supra note 8. 
 111. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 110. 
 112. See generally id. 
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B. Problems with Self-Regulation 
On the other hand, with the recent demutualization of stock exchanges, 
self-regulation has become increasingly problematic.113 Foremost, regu-
lation imposed by a publicly-listed company listed alongside the compa-
nies to which the regulation applies creates numerous conflicts of inter-
est.114 “A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for 
the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be em-
ployed for that end.”115 The stockholders will demand high prices in or-
der to maximize profit.116 However, for the stock exchange to remain an 
effective self-regulatory body, it will also have to take into account the 
interests of the customers who are listed on the exchange.117 Such cus-
tomers will demand low prices, and stock exchanges will be pressured to 
please both groups. This creates an inherent conflict of interest that did 
not exist before demutualization of stock exchanges, i.e., when the cus-
tomers were the owners of the stock exchanges.118 
The recent demutualization has created incentives for both over-
regulation and under- regulation by stock exchanges.119 The main incen-
tive for under-regulation arises from the desire to maximize profits.120 As 
with every business function, self-regulation will cause the stock ex-
change to incur expense and since the stock exchange is a business en-
terprise,121 it will weigh these expenses against the direct income from 
regulation.122 Since little income123 is generated by increased regulation, 
                                                                                                             
 113. “[D]emutualization by the self-regulated markets could exacerbate concerns about 
the ability or willingness of self-regulated markets to continue to develop and maintain 
high listing standards.” ABA Report, supra note 11, at 1540; see generally Karmel, List-
ing Requirements, supra note 69, at 348. 
 114. Fleckner, supra note 63, at 2590; IOSCO Technical Committee Paper, supra note 
64. 
 115. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. Sup. Ct. 1919). 
 116. Fleckner, supra note 63, at 2591. 
 117. See generally id. 
 118. Id. at 2591. 
As competition increases and exchanges move from mutual or cooperative enti-
ties to for-profit enterprises, new elements enter into the environment. The in-
terests of the owners of the exchange may diverge from those of the principal 
customers of its trading services. The commercial nature of the exchange be-
comes more evident: maximizing profits becomes an explicit objective. 
IOSCO Technical Committee Paper, supra note 64, at 2–3. 
 119. See generally Fleckner, supra note 63, at 2593–2595. 
 120. Id. at 2593. 
 121. See supra text accompanying notes 61–93. 
 122. Fleckner, supra note 63, at 2593. 
 123. And possibly no income. 
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publicly traded stock exchanges have little incentive to regulate.124 
Moreover, the desire to attract new customers who wish to list on the 
exchange, thereby increasing profits, could actually lead to decreased 
regulation.125 Aside from reducing the regulation imposed on customers, 
publicly held stock exchanges may also have an incentive to not enforce 
existing regulations. For example, a publicly held stock exchange that is 
listed on its own platform may choose not to enforce any regulation with 
which it is not itself in full compliance.126 
The desire to maximize profits may also create incentives to over-
regulate.127 Stock exchanges may collect fines and other kinds of pay-
ments from companies listed on the exchange for violations of imposed 
regulation.128 However, there is no guarantee that listed companies will 
in fact violate even the strictest of regulations.129 Over-regulation is not a 
sure source of profit for the stock exchange itself, so the main concern 
created by demutualization of stock exchanges is under-regulation.130 
Under-regulation creates a grave concern for the vitality of the mar-
kets. Securities regulation is essential to maintaining confidence in stock 
exchanges and financial markets in general.131 Because of the conflicts of 
interest created by demutualization, the publicly-held for-profit stock 
exchanges are not in the best position to ensure effective securities regu-
lation and investor confidence. Because the “law matters” and the 
strength of legal protection will determine companies’ access to external 
finance, the transnational stock exchanges will need outside regulation 
and guidance to insure the integrity of the listing requirements.132 
                                                                                                             
 124. Id. 
 125. IOSCO Technical Committee Paper, supra note 64; Fleckner, supra note 63, at 
2594. 
 126. Fleckner, supra note 63, at 2594. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 2594–2595. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See generally Groshen and Parchomovsky, supra note 10. 
 132. Coffee, supra note 12, at 1829. The more confidence investors have in the market 
and in the exchange, the more likely they are to provide capital to invest in the compa-
nies. See generally id.; ABA Report, supra note 11. This Note does not suggest that list-
ing requirements should be ignored. Listing requirements remain an essential part of 
securities regulation. However, now that stock exchanges are publicly owned and for-
profit, there is a need for an independent body that can supervise self-regulation rules and 
regulations. 
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III. EXISTING REGULATION: DIFFERENCES AND COOPERATION 
NYSE Euronext Inc. operates in both the European Union and the 
United States. Since the exchanges themselves cannot be relied on to be 
the main securities regulators, either governmental regulation system 
could, hypothetically, take the lead role in regulating NYSE Euronext 
Inc. One could argue that the United States should take the regulatory 
role because the company will be incorporated in the United States.133 On 
the other hand, perhaps regulation should be left to the European Union 
since that is where all but one exchange, the NYSE, are located. How-
ever, neither seems likely since neither jurisdiction will want to hand its 
regulatory powers over to the other.134 Therefore, the European Union 
and the United States could work together and regulate the exchange in 
harmony. 
On January 25, 2007, the SEC and the College of Euronext Regula-
tors135 signed a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) “in order to 
facilitate cooperation in market oversight” in relation to the creation of 
NYSE Euronext Inc.136 While the regulators agree to “consult, cooperate 
and exchange information in connection with oversight of NYSE Euron-
ext,” the “MOU does not create any legally binding obligations” on the 
parties.137 The MOU is a large step towards achieving convergence of 
regulations, but the MOU is more focused on “ongoing, informal, oral 
consultations [and] periodic meetings” and explicitly states that the au-
thorities involved stress the “importance of local regulation of local mar-
kets.”138 Such cooperation is a necessary step in facilitating the inevitable 
consolidation of exchanges across national borders, but, because of fun-
damental regulatory differences discussed below, there remain several 
barriers to overcome if stock exchanges truly begin to function on a 
transnational basis. In the face of continued stock exchange consolida-
tion, which increases the need for a single regulatory structure across 
                                                                                                             
 133. See Form S-4, supra note 30. 
 134. Regulatory systems are reluctant to relinquish any part of their sovereignty. See 
Poser, supra note 8, at 540. 
 135. The College of Euronext Regulators are the Authority for the Financial Markets 
(Netherlands), Autorité des Marchés Financiers (France), Banking Finance and Insurance 
Commission (Belgium), Comissão do Mercado de Calores Mobiliários (Portugal) and 
Financial Services Authority (United Kingdom). Memorandum of Understanding Con-
cerning Consultation, Cooperation and the Exchange of Information Related to Market 
Oversight (Jan. 25, 2007), available at http://www.sec.com/news/press/2007/2007-
8_mou.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2008). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 3. 
 138. Id. at 3, 5. 
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nations, full convergence in regulating stock exchanges may not occur, at 
least in present day. 
A. United States and European Union Systems 
Historically, the United States and the European Union139 come from 
two distinguished capital systems: a market-oriented model system and a 
bank-oriented model system.140 The U.S. system has followed the mar-
ket-oriented model whereby corporations collect capital directly from the 
public.141 The ownership structure is characterized by high fragmentation 
where one single owner can rarely independently affect the management 
of the corporation.142 European corporations, in contrast, follow the 
bank-oriented model and collect capital primarily through banks.143 Most 
often the result is that a single bank will finance the majority of the firm, 
offer a very wide range of services to corporations, and create the pres-
ence of major shareholders in the ownership structure of the firms from 
the outset.144 The U.S. separation of banks from the securities business is 
due in part to the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which prohibited commer-
cial banks from holding shares of industrial companies.145 In Europe, the 
separation of banks from the securities business did not occur.146 Corpo-
rate governance for companies listed on the NYSE is geared towards the 
protection of the individual investor, who needs more protection. Euron-
ext listed company regulations are more relaxed because they are aimed 
at the more sophisticated institutional investor who is better able to pro-
tect itself. 
The different investment systems and focus of regulations are evident 
through disparate securities laws such as Regulation NMS147 in the Unit-
ed States and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive148 (“Mi-
                                                                                                             
 139. Mainly Germany, France, and Italy. Gustavo Visentini, Compatibility and Com-
petition Between European and American Corporate Governance: Which Model of Capi-
talism?, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 833, 838 (1998). Because Euronext’s headquarters is lo-
cated in France, the merger with the NYSE poses the problem of harmonization between 
the United States and France. Therefore, much of this part of the analysis will focus on 
France. 
 140. Id. at 838–839. 
 141. Id. at 838. 
 142. Id. at 839. 
 143. Id. at 838–839. 
 144. Id. at 839. 
 145. Id. at 838. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Regulation NMS, 17 C.F.R. § 242.660 (2005). 
 148. Council Directive 2004/39, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1-44 (EC) amended by Council 
Directive 2006/31/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 114) 60-63 [hereinafter MiFID]. 
704 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:2 
FID”) in the European Union. Regulation NMS and MiFID are both 
aimed at reconciling competition between markets but “they are not nec-
essarily compatible.”149 For example, one of the four rules150 promul-
gated by Regulation NMS is an order protection rule against trade-
throughs151 for all national market system securities.152 A trade-through 
occurs when one trading center executes an order “at a price that is infe-
rior to the price of a protected quotation, often representing an investor 
limit order, displayed by another trade center.”153 One of the SEC’s justi-
fications for the order protection rule was that it “will promote intermar-
ket competition by leveling the playing field between automated and 
non-automated markets and, to the extent that the existing trade-through 
rule serves to constrain competition, by removing this barrier to competi-
tion.”154 This rule serves to eliminate any potential advantage that man-
ual markets had over automated systems.155 
In contrast, MiFID permits investment firms that frequently and sys-
tematically deal on their own accounts by executing orders outside a 
regulated market to make information available to only specific catego-
ries of clients.156 These investment firms can make quotes available 
“only to retail clients, only to professional clients, or both.”157 Although 
MiFID emphasizes fair competition among markets and market partici-
pants, it only suggests the removal of obstacles that could prevent fair 
competition and it allows electronic communications networks to deal 
with institutional investors outside of MiFID.158 This is unlike Regulation 
NMS which has caused electronic communications networks to consoli-
date and always operate within Regulation NMS, thereby “leveling the 
                                                                                                             
 149. Roberta Karmel, The Once and Future New York Stock Exchange: The Regulation 
of Global Exchanges, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 355, 371 (2007). 
 150. Id. at 372. 
 151. Id. The trade-through rules establish “intermarket protection against trade-
throughs.” Id. 
 152. National market system securities were redefined by Regulation NMS to mean 
“any security or class of securities for which transaction reports are collected, processed, 
and made available pursuant to an effective transaction reporting plan, or an effective 
national market system plan for reporting transactions in listed options.” Regulation 
NMS, 17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b)(46) (2005). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,594 (June 29, 2005)(to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. pt. 200, 201, 230, 240, 242, 249, and 270). 
 155. Karmel, The Once and Future New York Stock Exchange, supra note 149, at 372. 
 156. Id. at 376. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 378. 
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playing field.”159 One explanation for this disparity is because the United 
States comes from a market-oriented model system of regulation while 
the European Union comes from a bank-oriented model system. 
Another notable difference between U.S. and E.U. securities law 
caused by the different market structure is that the United States provides 
for private enforcement by individuals alongside criminal actions by the 
state, but the private remedy is not always available in Europe.160 Most of 
the securities law governing member states of the European Union is 
provided through directives proposed by the European Commission, 
which, if enacted by the Council, become part of Community law.161 Di-
rectives impose binding guidelines on member states, and failure to pro-
pose legislation within these guidelines could lead to action against the 
state by the Commission.162 Individual rights to bring an action for a vio-
lation of securities law, such as those found in the United States, are not 
typically found in directives.163 
Currently, the United States is a two-tiered system of securities regula-
tion, and market participants have to comply with both federal and state 
laws.164 The SEC, empowered by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
has broad authority over the securities industry in the United States, in-
cluding the power to regulate and register the various stock exchanges 
and participants of the exchanges.165 Although the SEC remains limited 
in what rules and regulations it can create and enforce, the agency exerts 
direct power and binding authority over the securities markets.166 
E.U. securities law is less centralized, at least in part because the direc-
tives simply establish goals and guidelines but leave it up to the member 
states to decide how to implement and enforce such goals.167 This struc-
ture has been a significant barrier to achieving a truly uniform E.U. secu-
                                                                                                             
 159. Regulation NMS, supra note 154; see also Karmel, The Once and Future New 
York Stock Exchange, supra note 149, at 378. 
 160. Eric Engle, The EU Means Business: A Survey of Legal Challenges and Opportu-
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 161. Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 57(2), Oct. 2, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 
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 162. Engle, supra note 160, at 359. 
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See id. 
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rities law.168 In some ways, it appears to be a two-tiered system because 
the European Community does in fact issue binding directives on the 
member states, but, unlike the SEC which has been granted direct powers 
to regulate, the “implementation and enforcement of securities law in the 
E.U. is found in the national law of the member states.”169 The European 
Union does retain some control over securities law because each member 
state is subject to obligations under European Union and European 
Community treaties.170 However, because the decision of how to enforce 
these directives is left to the member states, the “starting point” for 
European securities law is found in each nation state’s securities laws 
and not those of the European Union.171 In contrast, U.S. securities law is 
basically federal and is simply supplemented by state laws.172 
Such fundamental differences pose practical problems in enacting con-
verging laws and regulations. Even if the European Commission were to 
comply entirely with the United States regulations, the E.U. member 
states retain a certain amount of implementation and enforcement pow-
ers. Therefore, there is no guarantee that each state would implement 
directives in the same manner. Furthermore, the United States system is 
concerned with the individual investor, but the European system is con-
cerned with the large institutional investor. 
B. Europe and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
One of the largest concerns for NYSE Euronext Inc. is that “[f]oreign 
companies do not . . . generally wish to become subject to regulation by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . and . . . have been clamor-
                                                                                                             
 168. See generally id. The European Union has, as of yet, been unable to form a single 
securities law governing all member states. Some have suggested a European Securities 
and Exchange Commission similar to that of the United States. Id. See also Roberta S. 
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gle, supra note 160, at 358, 379. 
 170. For example, despite the fact that the laws of each nation state decides whether a 
financial instrument is a security, a security is now substantively defined through direc-
tives of the European Commission. Engle, supra note 160, at 358. 
 171. Id. at 379. 
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ing to exit from the U.S. disclosure system.”173 Moreover, the NYSE has 
been losing listings, especially initial public offerings, to foreign ex-
changes.174 In the words of Securities and Exchange Commissioner Paul 
S. Atkins, “According to the Wall Street Journal, in the year 2000 nine 
out of every ten dollars raised by foreign companies through new stock 
listings were done in New York, but by 2005 the numbers had reversed 
so that nine out of every 10 dollars were raised outside of America.”175 
In the wake of corporate scandals of the 1990s,176 the U.S. Congress 
amended the laws governing corporate governance and disclosure 
through the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley.177 Sarbanes-Oxley fo-
cuses mainly on heightening disclosure by regulated companies to in-
crease investor confidence.178 Among many other things, Sarbanes-Oxley 
increases regulation over auditing committees, calls for the independence 
of such committees, requires companies to adopt and disclose a code of 
ethics, and calls for greater transparency and heightened disclosure.179 
On December 20, 2002, shortly after Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted, Da-
vid Devlin, the President of the Fédération des Experts Comptables Eu-
ropéens (European Federation of Accountants), addressed a letter to Jo-
nathan G. Katz, Secretary of the U.S. SEC.180 Devlin stated that the Eu-
ropean Federation of Accountants supports the provisions of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act, but went on to say, 
[T]he Act is very much related to the U.S. legal environment and can 
be seen as a reaction to mainly U.S. financial reporting problems. For 
European companies and their auditors, many of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act measures, especially as regards their details, are, in our opinion, 
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 175. Paul S. Atkins, United States Securities and Exchange Commissioner, Remarks 
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unnecessary, disproportionate, burdensome, or even impossible to ap-
ply.181 
Compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley is very costly, especially to the 
smaller corporation.182 Additionally, Sarbanes-Oxley, enacted hastily in 
response to financial scandals, includes sections which apply to foreign 
issuers without consideration as to whether it was appropriate to do so.183 
Generally, foreign issuers can obtain exemptions from both stock ex-
change listing requirements and other governmental regulations,184 but 
Sarbanes-Oxley does not make such an exception. Foreign issuer regis-
trations and listings have declined in recent years as a result of Sarbanes-
Oxley. Because Sarbanes-Oxley imposes on companies much more de-
manding corporate governance standards than regulations in Europe, the 
United States has lost a significant portion of initial public offerings to 
foreign stock exchanges in the recent years since its passage.185 Such 
trends could explain why the NYSE believed it was in their best interest 
to merge with Euronext. However, the same facts explain the European 
resistance to Sarbanes-Oxley and pre-merger resistance to NYSE Euron-
ext Inc. 
Despite this resistance, European securities regulations appear similar 
to Sarbanes-Oxley in many respects. In 1999, the European Union com-
pleted the Financial Services Action Plan (“FSAP”), “an ambitious re-
form agenda . . . designed to provide the regulatory underpinning for a 
single deep and liquid capital market . . . under harmonized rules.”186 
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Id. (citing NYSE Chairman Marshall Carter testimony to House Capital Markets Sub-
committee. Apr. 26, 2006). 
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FSAP has increasingly become more regulatory187 and reflects the policy 
goals of E.U. securities laws to protect investors and assure proper func-
tioning of the capital market.188 In many ways, after the U.S. passage of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, foreign regulators such as the FSAP have begun “to put 
in place their own corporate governance reforms in response to the scan-
dals in the capital markets and Sarbanes-Oxley.”189 
In May 2003, the European Commission presented another action plan 
titled Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance 
in the European Union — A Plan to Move Forward which calls for en-
hanced corporate governance standards.190 The plan’s initiatives include 
requiring listed companies to submit an annual statement concerning in-
ternal corporate governance (or a code of ethics), promoting independ-
ence of directors, and calling for heightened transparency.191 Many paral-
lels can be drawn between this action plan and recent U.S. legislation 
such as Sarbanes-Oxley. Some have even suggested that Sarbanes-Oxley 
did nothing more than codify what was already accepted as good corpo-
rate governance and practice.192 In fact, such parallels have been used to 
argue a pattern of “foreign regulators’ responsive actions to impose some 
of the same new standards” that the United States has imposed.193 
Nevertheless, Sarbanes-Oxley and similar European regulations are not 
quite the same. The United States regulators require a much higher stan-
dard of disclosure than do their European counterparts. Therefore, there 
is an inherent conflict for companies that are traded in the United States 
and European Union because, at least for companies foreign to the Unit-
ed States, meeting the home country requirements will not always satisfy 
U.S. rules and regulations. Despite these differences in securities law, as 
globalization moves forward and the publicly-held stock exchanges at-
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tempt to maximize efficiency and profitability, the European Union and 
United States will have to cooperate and attempt to work out such differ-
ences. As Securities and Exchange Commissioner Nazareth recognized, 
attempting to harmonize international securities regulation “would not 
succeed if a single regulatory authority or standard setter operated in iso-
lation or tried to achieve convergence on a jurisdiction by jurisdiction 
basis.”194 
C. Existing International Regulatory Organizations and Cooperation 
At a quick glance, E.U. and U.S. securities law appear relatively coop-
erative in past years and, at least on policies and overarching principles, 
seem to agree on large-scale securities regulation issues.195 This is evi-
denced through cooperative dialogue for accomplishing international and 
cross-border securities regulation, such as the Memorandum of Under-
standing between the SEC and the College of Euronext Regulators.196 
The scope of regulatory cooperation goes well beyond that single agree-
ment. For example, the SEC has an Office of International Affairs for the 
promotion of international regulatory and enforcement cooperation.197 
The United States’ Financial Accounting Standards Board and the Inter-
national Accounting Standards Board are working together in an attempt 
to converge two sets of accounting standards.198 In August 2006, the SEC 
and the Committee of European Securities Regulators issued a joint work 
plan which was a direct result of a December 2005 meeting between the 
chairmen of each organization.199 In addition, the Securities and Ex-
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change Commission’s Consolidated Supervised Entity program and the 
European Union’s Financial Conglomerates Directive have begun to 
harmonize regulation in areas such as large global investment banks.200 
Another example of cooperation is the International Corporate Gov-
ernance Network (“ICGN”), which was formed in 1995 by a group of 
institutional investors.201 The ICGN adopted corporate governance prin-
ciples202 and many member institutional investors, such as pension funds, 
have relied on these principles in internal formation.203 While the princi-
ples are sound guidelines, they have only been applied internally by insti-
tutional investor members and do not apply to the regulators them-
selves.204 
Each country affected by the creation of NYSE Euronext Inc. also co-
operates with each other through the to the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (“OECD”).205 In 1999 and again in 2004, 
the organization published the OECD Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance.206 The publication is simply a statement of the principles that 
member states should follow to achieve good corporate governance stan-
dards and it is not binding on the member states. 207 The principles do not 
suggest that any one form of governance is appropriate, but instead high-
light similar underlying elements.208 The organization aims to lay down a 
core set of guidelines governing the behavior of corporations in any mar-
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ket economy.209 The first principle set forth is “Ensuring the Basis for an 
Effective Corporate Governance Framework,” and it states that “[t]he 
corporate governance framework should promote transparent and effi-
cient markets, be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the 
division of responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and 
enforcement authorities.”210 The principles were published before the 
realization of a global stock exchange such as NYSE Euronext Inc. 
However, the OECD recognized that, even on a domestic level, there are 
often multiple legal domains acting on one regulated entity and it calls 
for the need to limit overlaps and potential conflict.211 
As for the national securities regulators affected by the NYSE-
Euronext merger, the United States’ Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, France’s Autorité des Marchés Financiers, Belgium’s Banking, Fi-
nance, and Insurance Commission, the Netherlands Authority for the Fi-
nancial Markets, Portugal’s Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mo-
biliários, and the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority all par-
ticipate in the International Organization of Securities Commissions and 
Similar Organizations (“IOSCO”).212 Moreover, commissioners from 
securities regulation agencies of the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, and Belgium are members of IOSCO’s executive committee.213 
IOSCO was formed in 1983 between North and South American securi-
ties regulatory agencies.214 European and Asian securities regulatory 
agencies began to join in 1984, and “[t]oday IOSCO is recognized as the 
international standard setter for securities markets.”215 Under the Pream-
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ble to IOSCO’s bylaws, these “[s]ecurities authorities resolve to cooper-
ate together to ensure a better regulation of the markets, on the domestic 
as well as on the international level, in order to maintain just, efficient 
and sound markets.”216 IOSCO decided to undertake harmonization is-
sues subsequent to its fourteenth annual conference in 1989 and has been 
grappling with it ever since.217 
Nevertheless, IOSCO has been called the most important of all organi-
zations for influencing international securities regulations218 and in May 
2003 the organization published the Objectives and Principles of Securi-
ties Regulation, which lays out thirty principles derived from three main 
objectives for securities regulation.219 The three objectives are “the pro-
tection of investors,” “ensuring that markets are fair, efficient . . . trans-
parent,” and “the reduction of systematic risk.”220 IOSCO recognizes the 
trend towards global market places and the need for “increasing interde-
pendence of regulators.”221 However, IOSCO does not have binding reg-
ulatory authority over its members, who have encountered many difficul-
ties in coming to harmony.222 It follows, therefore, that if the best organi-
zation for influencing international securities regulations lacks binding 
power over its members, there is actually an “absence of true ‘interna-
tional securities regulation.’”223 
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
While it remains true that IOSCO lacks binding powers over its mem-
bers and enforcement mechanisms, it also remains true that IOSCO has 
been the best organization for influencing international securities. Ideal 
transnational regulation could be achieved by creating an organization 
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following IOSCO’s widely accepted foundations but giving that organi-
zation binding, self-regulatory powers over the transnational stock ex-
changes.224  
A special study of the American Bar Association found that the United 
States Congress may authorized a special self-regulating-type entity to 
fill in what was then a void in the corporate governance process.225 The 
entity proposed by the American Bar Association would be quasi-
governmental in nature, but it would not be a complete substitute for 
self-regulation by the stock exchanges themselves.226 As a slight varia-
tion to this suggestion, such a quasi-governmental entity could be created 
on an international basis to converge separate national securities regula-
tion regimes. This would remain a quasi-governmental agency, not a full-
fledged governmental agency, because governmental bodies are not al-
ways best suited to make the same kinds of business decisions that are 
involved in maintaining an international securities market.227 
The new organization would, of course, require authorization through a 
treaty or multiple treaties ratified by and binding upon each country. 
Member countries would each send one person, qualified in the home 
state for the role of a securities regulator, to the organization and each 
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country would have a say in the operations and decisions of the organiza-
tion. Any future transnational stock exchanges operating among coun-
tries party to the treaty would fall under the jurisdiction of this organiza-
tion. New rules and regulations, binding on each member country, would 
be generated through negotiations in which each country would have a 
right to participate. Final rules would take the form of a treaty signed by 
each member state. Major issues applying to a large number of ex-
changes may be resolved in treaties to which every member nation is 
bound, and issues more specific to an individual stock exchange could be 
resolved through treaties to which only affected member states are party. 
During the negotiation process, each member country’s authority over 
the process would be weighted according to the percentage of listed 
companies operating within that country as compared to the overall 
number of listed companies. As other exchanges become transnational 
and fall under the organization’s authority, the weight due to each mem-
ber state’s position may change, but matters previously decided will re-
main unaffected and will apply to these new exchanges equally, so long 
as the exchanges affected lie within a previously bound member state. 
The newly created organization would play more of a monitoring role. 
Like IOSCO, it would produce and promote principles for corporate go-
vernance standards. However, these principles would be binding on the 
stock exchanges. The stock exchanges themselves would be required to 
issue listing requirements in accordance with these standards. The or-
ganization would have the power to approve or amend the rules as pro-
posed by the stock exchange for implementation and enforcement upon 
market participants. The stock exchanges would adhere to the principles, 
but there would be enough flexibility for each exchange to take into ac-
count similarities and differences of each country in which they operate. 
Since, as previously discussed, listing requirements by stock exchanges 
themselves are an essential part of securing the integrity of the financial 
markets, the exchanges themselves would remain the chief enforcement 
mechanism. However, because of the problems with demutualization and 
the conflicts of interest that have been created, this new entity is neces-
sary to oversee the stock exchange listing requirements through formal 
and binding approval processes for stock exchange implementation of 
the organization’s rules and regulations. 
CONCLUSION  
Such an organization may not work in practical terms, at least with the 
state of the world today. Neither the United States nor the European Un-
ion will look favorably on releasing control over regulation within their 
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jurisdictions.228 However, this new organization would not require the 
domestic governments to give up all regulatory powers. For example, the 
SEC would still have jurisdiction over national exchanges remaining in 
the United States. Additionally, each government could retain an appro-
priate amount of authority within the organization depending on the per-
centage of listed companies operating in each country. There is also the 
possibility that binding principles may conflict with the domestic laws of 
a member state governing domestic markets. Ideally any such conflicts 
will be overcome by maintaining firm principles with flexible implemen-
tation by stock exchanges, allowing specific regulations to incorporate 
domestic concerns. 
Potential conflicts with domestic governmental agencies may become 
even less important in light of the uncertainty as to what the role of gov-
ernment regulators should be in influencing the future structure of the 
markets.229 The European Commission has not had much of an influence 
over the development of the cross-border links of Euronext, nor has the 
SEC influenced the creation of NYSE Euronext Inc. Consolidation is 
driven by the exchanges themselves as they begin to seek more effective 
and efficient ways to maximize profit.230 Therefore, it would make sense 
to allow the driving force behind consolidation to take on the task of re-
gulating such consolidated entities, but the stock exchanges cannot be 
relied upon because of the conflicts inherent in these demutualized, for-
profit entities.231 
The fact of the matter is that stock exchanges are ready to become 
transnational, but the world is not prepared to effectively regulate them. 
Still, the more confidence investors have in the markets, the more likely 
they are to provide capital to invest in companies.232 The world is mov-
ing towards a securities market system whereby a single investor sitting 
anywhere in the world will be able to engage the purchase and sale of 
securities anywhere else in the world. Having a uniform set of standards 
under which that investor can do so would makes her more confident in 
the system and more likely to contribute capital. To achieve these bene-
fits, someone needs to assume the regulatory role. 
IOSCO has attempted the closest and most successful regulators for-
ays, but even actions taken by that organization are merely suggestions 
and have no binding authority over its members. Consequently, the prob-
lem is how to enforce the accomplishments of IOSCO. There is no per-
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fect solution to the lack of a sufficient regulatory body; however, an in-
ternational organization with monitoring and enforcement powers could 
fill the regulatory gaps by ensuring that the principles many countries 
agree upon today are honestly implemented in the future. 
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